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Abstract—Edge computing is emerging as a new paradigm to
allow processing data at the edge of the network, where data is
typically generated and collected, by exploiting multiple devices
at the edge collectively. However, offloading tasks to other devices
leaves the edge computing applications at the complete mercy
of an attacker. One of the attacks, which is also the focus of
this work, is Byzantine attacks, where one or more devices can
corrupt the offloaded tasks. Furthermore, exploiting the potential
of edge computing is challenging mainly due to the heterogeneous
and time-varying nature of the devices at the edge. In this paper,
we develop a secure coded cooperative computation mechanism
(SC3) that provides both security and computation efficiency
guarantees by gracefully combining homomorphic hash functions
and coded cooperative computation. Homomorphic hash func-
tions are used against Byzantine attacks and coded cooperative
computation is used to improve computation efficiency when edge
resources are heterogeneous and time-varying.
Simulations results show that SC3 improves task completion
delay significantly.
I. INTRODUCTION
Edge computing is emerging as a new paradigm to allow
processing data at the edge of the network, where data is
typically generated and collected. This paradigm advocates
offloading tasks from an edge device to other edge/end devices
including mobile devices, and/or servers in close proximity.
Edge computing can be used in Internet of Things (IoT)
applications which connects an exponentially increasing num-
ber of devices, including smartphones, wireless sensors, and
health monitoring devices at the edge. Many IoT applications
require processing the data collected by these devices through
computationally intensive algorithms with stringent reliability,
security and latency constraints. In many scenarios, these
algorithms cannot be run locally on computationally-limited
IoT-devices.
One of the existing solutions to handle computationally-
intensive tasks is computation offloading, which advocates
offloading tasks to remote servers or to cloud computing
platforms. Yet, offloading tasks to remote servers or to the
cloud could be a luxury that cannot be afforded by most edge
applications, where connectivity to remote servers can be ex-
pensive, energy consuming, lost or compromised. In addition,
offloading tasks to remote servers may not be efficient in terms
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of delay, especially when data is generated and collected at
the edge. This makes edge computing a promising solution
to handle computationally-intensive tasks, where the task is
divided into sub-tasks and each sub-task is offloaded to an
edge device for computation.
However, offloading tasks to other devices leaves the edge
computing applications at the complete mercy of an attacker.
One of the attacks, which is the focus of this work, is Byzantine
attacks, where one or more devices (workers) can corrupt the
offloaded tasks. Furthermore, exploiting the potential of edge
computing is challenging mainly due to the heterogeneous
and time-varying nature of the devices at the edge. Thus, our
goal is to develop a secure, dynamic, and heterogeneity-aware
edge computing mechanism that provides both security and
computation efficiency guarantees.
Our key tool is the graceful use of coded cooperative
computation and homomorphic hash functions. Coded com-
putation advocates mixing data in computationally-intensive
tasks by employing erasure codes and offloading these coded
tasks to other devices for computation [1]–[13]. The following
canonical example demonstrates the effectiveness of coded
computation.
Example 1: Consider the setup where a master device
wishes to offload a task to 3 workers. The master has a large
data matrix A and wants to compute matrix vector product
Ax.
The master device divides the matrix A row-wise equally
into two smaller matrices A1 and A2, which are then encoded
using a (3, 2) Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) code1 to
give B1 = A1, B2 = A2 and B3 = A1+A2, and sends each to
a different worker. Also, the master device sends x to workers
and asks them to compute Bix, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. When the master
receives the computed values (i.e., Bix) from at least two out
of three workers, it can decode its desired task, which is the
computation of Ax. The power of coded computations is that
it makes B3 = A1 + A2 act as a “joker” redundant task that
can replace any one of the other two tasks if a worker ends
up straggling, i.e., being slow or unresponsive. 
This example demonstrates the benefit of coding for edge
computing. However, the very nature of task offloading to
workers makes the computation framework vulnerable to
1An (n, k) MDS code divides the master’s data into k chunks and encodes
it into n chunks (n > k) such that any k chunks out of n are sufficient to
recover the original data.
attacks. We focus on Byzantine attacks in this work. For
example, if workers 1 and 3 in Example 1 corrupt B1x and
B3x, the master can only obtain a wrong value of Ax. Thus,
it is crucial to develop a secure coded computation mechanism
for edge devices against this type of attacks.
In this paper, we develop a secure coded cooperative
computation (SC3) mechanism which uses homomorphic hash
functions. Example 2 illustrates the main idea of homomorphic
hash functions in coded computation.
Example 2: Consider the same setup in Example 1, and
assume that worker i returns the computed value y˜i to the
master device. If worker i is an honest worker, y˜i = Bix
holds. The master device checks the integrity of y˜i by cal-
culating its hash function h(y˜i), where h is a homomorphic
hash function. (The details of the homomorphic hash function
which we use will be provided in Section II.) The master also
calculates h(Bix) using its local information, i.e., using h(x)
and Bi. If the master finds that h(y˜i) 6= h(Bix), it concludes
that the computed value is corrupted. Otherwise, y˜i is declared
as verified.

The above example shows how homomorphic hash func-
tions can be used for coded computation. However, existing
hash-based solutions [14], [15] introduce high computational
overhead, which is not suitable for edge applications, where
computation power and energy are typically limited. In this
paper, we use homomorphic hash functions and coded compu-
tation gracefully and efficiently. In particular, we develop and
analyze light-weight and heavy-weight integrity check tools
for coded computation using homomorphic hash functions. We
design SC3 by exploiting both light- and heavy-weight tools.
The following are the key contributions of this work:
• We use a homomorphic hash function as in [15] and show
that the hash of a linear combination of computed values
can be constructed by the hashes of the original tasks.
• We develop light- and heavy-weight integrity check tools
for coded computation, and analyze these tools in terms
of computation complexity and attack detection proba-
bility. We also analyze the trade-off between using light-
and heavy-weight tools for different number of tasks.
• We design SC3 by exploiting light- and heavy-weight
tools. If an attack is detected, SC3 can pinpoint which
tasks are corrupted.
• We analyze the task completion delay of SC3 by provid-
ing an upper bound as well as a lower bound on the gap
between the task completion delay of SC3 and a baseline.
• We evaluate SC3 for different number and strength of ma-
licious (Byzantine) workers. The simulation results show
that our algorithm significantly improves task completion
delay as compared to the baselines.
The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows.
Section II presents our system model. Section III presents
light- and heavy-weight integrity check tools. Section IV
presents our secure coded cooperative computation (SC3)
algorithm. Section V provides the theoretical analysis of the
task completion delay of SC3. Section VI provides simulation
results of SC3. Section VII presents related work. Section VIII
concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Setup. We consider a master/worker setup at the edge of the
network, where the master device offloads its computationally
intensive tasks to workers wn, n ∈ N (where |N | = N )
via device-to-device (D2D) links such as Wi-Fi Direct and/or
Bluetooth. The master device divides a task into smaller sub-
tasks, and offloads them to parallel processing workers. Task
Model. Our focus is on computation of linear functions; i.e.,
the master device would like to compute the multiplication of
matrix A with vector x; y = Ax, where A = (ai,j) ∈ F
R×C
ψ ,
x = (xi) ∈ F
C×1
ψ , and Fψ is a finite field. The motivation of
focusing on linear functions stems from matrix multiplication
applications where computing linear functions is a building
block of several iterative algorithms such as gradient descent.
Coding. We divide matrix A into R rows denoted by Ai,
i = 1, . . . , R. The master device applies Fountain coding
[16]–[18] across rows to create coded information packets
qj ,
∑R
i=1 γi,jAi, j = 1, 2, . . . , R + ǫ, where ǫ is the
overhead required by Fountain coding2, and γi,j ∈ {0, 1} are
coding coefficients of Fountain coding and the information
packet qj is a row vector with size C. Rateless coding enabled
by Fountain codes is compatible with our goal to deal with
heterogeneity and time-varying nature of resources. In other
words, coded packets are generated on the fly and transmitted
to workers depending on the amount of their resources (as
described in Section IV-A) and Fountain codes are flexible to
achieve this goal.
Worker & Attack Model. The workers incur random delays
while executing the task assigned to them by the master device.
The workers have different computation and communication
specifications resulting in a heterogeneous environment which
includes workers that are significantly slower than others,
known as stragglers. Moreover, the workers cannot be trusted
by the master. In particular, we consider Byzantine attacks,
where one or more workers can corrupt the tasks that are
assigned to them.
Homomorphic Hash Function. We consider the following
hash function that maps a large number a to an output with
much smaller size
h(a) , mod (g mod (a,q), r), (1)
where q is a prime number selected randomly from the field
Fφ, r is a prime number that satisfies q|(r − 1) (i.e., r − 1 is
divisible by q) and g is a number in Fr which is calculated
as g = b(r−1)/q for a random selection of b ∈ Fr, b 6= 1
[14], [15]. The defined hash function is a collision-resistant
hash function with the property that when φ increases, a is
compressed less; i.e., h(a) becomes a better approximation of
a for larger φ. However, the computational cost of calculating
h(a) increases for larger φ. Thus, there is a trade-off between
computational complexity and better approximation of a in
2The overhead required by Fountain coding is typically as low as 5% [18].
calculating h(a). Our goal is to exploit this trade-off in
the context of coded computation as described in the next
sections. Another property of the defined hash function is
homomorphism, i.e., h(
∑
i ciai) =
∏
i h(ai)
ci , which we will
exploit in matrix-vector multiplication (in Section III).
Delay Model. Each packet transmitted from the master
to a worker wn, n = 1, 2, ..., N experiences the following
delays: (i) transmission delay for sending the packet from the
master to the worker, (ii) computation delay for computing
the multiplication of the packet by the vector x, and (iii)
transmission delay for sending the computed packet from
the worker wn back to the master. We denote by βn,i the
computation time of the ith packet at worker n.
III. LIGHT- AND HEAVY-WEIGHT INTEGRITY CHECK
TOOLS FOR CODED COMPUTATION
In this section we present how homomorphic hash functions
considered in [14], [15] and defined in (1) are used gracefully
with coded computation. We first show that (1) can be applied
to coded computation. Then, we develop light- and heavy-
weight integrity check tools. The tools we develop in this
section will be building blocks of our secure coded cooperative
computation mechanism (SC3).
A. Homomorphic Hash Function for Coded Computation
Let us consider that Zn coded information packets are
offloaded to worker wn. The i
th packet offloaded to wn
is pn,i ∈ {q1, . . . ,qR+ǫ}, which can be represented as
pn,i = (pn,i,1, . . . , pn,i,C), where pn,i,j is the j
th element of
vector pn,i. Worker wn calculates yn,i = pn,ix and sends it
back to the master device.
Assume that the master receives y˜n,i from wn, where y˜n,i =
yn,i if packet is not corrupted. The master device checks the
integrity of packets calculated at wn according to the following
rule. First, it calculates
αn = h(
Zn∑
i=1
ciy˜n,i), (2)
using the hash function defined in (1), where ci’s are coeffi-
cients (We will discuss how ci is selected later in this section.).
Next, it calculates
βn = mod
( C∏
j=1
h(xj)
mod
(
(
∑Zn
i=1 cipn,i,j),q
)
, r
)
, (3)
where xj is the j
th element of vector x, and q and r are the
parameters of the hash function defined in (1). βn in (3) is
calculated by the master device using its local data pn,i and
x. βn is used to check αn as described in the next theorem.
Theorem 1: If wn does not corrupt packets, i.e., y˜n,i = yn,i,
∀i, and ci is a nonzero integer, then αn = βn holds.
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix A. 
We note that Theorem 1 is necessary, but not sufficient con-
dition to determine if wn is malicious or not. The sufficiency
condition depends on how ci is selected as explained next.
B. Light-Weight Integrity Check (LW Function)
The light-weight integrity check (LW function) uses The-
orem 1 to determine if workers corrupt packets or not. In
particular, LW function calculates αn in (2) and βn in (3)
by selecting ci randomly and uniformly from {−1, 1}. LW
function concludes that packets processed by wn are not
corrupted if αn = βn. However, as we discussed earlier, this
condition is not always a sufficient condition, so LW function
detects attacks with some probability, which is provided next.
1) Probability of Attack Detection: We first consider a pair-
wise Byzantine attack, where malicious worker wn corrupts
two packets out of Zn packets by adding and subtracting terms.
For example, y˜n,i = yn,i + δi and y˜n,j = yn,j − δj , for any
arbitrary i,j ≤ Zn satisfying i 6= j. In this attack pattern, if
|δi| 6= |δj |, and considering that the coefficients are selected
from {−1, 1} in LW function, the attack is detected with 100%
probability. On the other hand, if the attack is symmetric, i.e.,
|δi| = |δj |, the probability of detecting the attack is 50%. As
symmetrical attacks are the most difficult ones to detect, we
focus on this scenario in the next lemma.
Lemma 2: Consider an attack where the malicious worker
wn selects an even number Z˜n randomly out of Zn packets
and corrupt them by adding δ to half of them, and subtracting
δ from the other half. The probability of attack detection by
LW function is
P LWdetect = 1−
( Z˜n!
2Z˜n
(
(Z˜n/2)!
)2
)
. (4)
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix B. 
As seen from Lemma 2, the probability of attack detection
increases with increasing number of corrupted packets. This
result intuitively holds for any attack pattern as the coefficients
(ci) are selected randomly for each packet and estimating
these values by an attacker becomes difficult for larger set
of corrupted packets. Another attack pattern and its detection
probability are provided in the following.
Consider an attack pattern where the malicious worker wn
corrupts three packets out of Zn packets by adding δ to
two of randomly selected computed packets and subtracting
2δ from another randomly selected computed packet. This
attack pattern can be detected unless the coefficients for the
three corrupted packets are all 1’s or all −1’s. Therefore,
the probability of attack detection for this attack pattern is
(1 − 2/23) × 100 = 75%. For a general attack pattern, the
following lemma, provides a lower bound on the probability
of attack detection.
Proposition 3: The probability of attack detection when LW
function is used and for any attack pattern is lower bounded
by P LWdetect ≥ 0.5.
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix C. 
2) Computational Complexity:
Theorem 4: The computational complexity of LW func-
tion for checking Zn packets calculated by wn is
O(CM(r) log2 q), where C is the size of each information
packet, M(r) is the complexity of multiplication in Fr, and r
and q are the parameters of the hash function defined in (1).
Proof: The complexity of LW function consists of two parts;
calculation of αn in (2) and βn in (3). We first analyze com-
putational complexity of calculating αn. The sum
∑Zn
i=1 ciy˜n,i
only has addition and subtraction as ci ∈ {−1, 1}, and can be
ignored. The complexity of the modular exponentiation while
calculating the hash function is O(M(r) log2 q) by using the
method of exponentiation by squaring.
Similarly, we can calculate the computational com-
plexity of calculating βn. The complexity for computing∑Zn
i=1 cipn,i,j corresponds to the complexity of addition and
subtraction, which is negligible. The complexity of com-
puting mod (
∏C
j=1 h(xj)
mod (
∑Zn
i=1 cipn,i,j ,q), r) has two
components: (i) Calculating the modular exponentiations
h(xj)
mod (
∑Zn
i=1 cipn,i,j ,q), ∀j = 1, 2, ..., C: The complexity
for this calculation is O(M(r) log2 q) for one modular ex-
ponentiation and O(CM(r) log2 q) for all C modular expo-
nentiations. (ii) Multiplying all the calculated modular expo-
nentiations, i.e.,
∏C
j=1 h(xj)
mod (
∑Zn
i=1 cipn,i,j ,q) in Fr: The
complexity for this calculation is O((C − 1)M(r)). Thus, the
total complexity of LW function becomes O(CM(r) log2 q).
This concludes the proof. 
Noting that the computational complexity of calculating
the original matrix multiplication is O(RCM(ψ)), where
M(ψ) is the complexity of multiplication in Fψ. As seen, the
complexity of the LW function is significantly low, compared
to the original task. This means LW function provides security
check with low complexity. However, the probability of attack
detection using LW function could be as low as 50%, which
may not be acceptable in some applications. Thus, we provide
a heavy-weight integrity check tool (HW function) in the next
section. Our ultimate goal is to use LW and HW functions
together for higher attack detection probability while still
having low computational complexity.
C. Heavy-Weight Integrity Check (HW Function)
The heavy-weight integrity check (HW function) uses The-
orem 1 similar to the LW function, but chooses the coefficients
ci from a larger field Fq rather than {−1, 1}. This selection,
i.e., choosing coefficients from a larger field, comes with larger
attack detection probability and computational complexity as
described next.
1) Probability of Attack Detection:
Lemma 5: The probability that HW function detects a
Byzantine attack with any attack pattern is expressed as
PHWdetect = 1−
1
q
(5)
where q is the parameter of the hash function in (1).
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix D. 
As seen from Lemma 5, the attack detection probability in-
creases with increasing q. Next, we present the computational
complexity of HW function.
2) Computational Complexity:
Theorem 6: The computational complexity of HW function
for checking Zn packets calculated by wn is O(CZnM(φ)).
Proof: The proof follows the same logic of the proof of
Theorem 4, i.e., the complexity of HW function depends on
calculating αn in (2) and βn in (3). The difference as compared
to the proof of Theorem 4 is that ci’s are selected from a larger
field, so reducing multiplication to addition in
∑Zn
i=1 ciy˜n,i of
(2) and
∑Zn
i=1 cipn,i,j of (3) cannot be made. In particular,
the complexity of calculating these terms is O(ZnM(φ)).
Following similar steps as in the proof of Theorem 4, we can
conclude that the computational complexity of HW function
becomes O(CM(r) log2 q)+O(CZnM(φ)). Since the second
term dominates the computational complexity for large R
(hence Zn), we calculate the computational complexity as
O(CZnM(φ)). This concludes the proof. 
We can approximate Zn to (R + ǫ)/N on average assum-
ing that coded information packets are distributed homoge-
neously across workers, where R is the number of information
packets, ǫ is the Fountain coding overhead, and N is the
number of workers. Thus, the computational complexity of
HW function across all workers becomes NO(C(R+ǫ)N M(φ)).
As we discussed earlier, the computational complexity of
the original matrix multiplication is O(RCM(ψ)). We also
note that M(ψ) >> M(φ). This means that even though
HW function is computationally-complex as compared to LW
function, it is still computationally-efficient with respect to the
original matrix multiplication (considering that ǫ is small and
approaches to 0 with increasing number of packets).
D. Light- versus Heavy-Weight Integrity Check
In this section, we investigate employing LW function multi-
ple rounds/times to achieve higher attack detection probability
with low computational complexity. LW function is used to
check Zn packets computed by wn by selecting ci uniformly
randomly from {−1, 1}. Let us call this the first round. In
the second round, we can use LW function again, but selected
values of ci will be different from the first round. Thus, if an
attack is not detected in the first round, it may still be detected
in the next round. Thus, using LW function over multiple
rounds will increase the attack detection probability. The next
theorem characterizes the performance of LW function when
used in multiple rounds as compared to HW function.
Theorem 7: The attack detection probability of multiple-
round LW function is equal to the attack detection probability
of HW function in (5) when LW function is used for log2(q)
rounds. Furthermore, the computational complexity of log2(q)-
round LW function is lower than HW function if the following
condition is satisfied.
Zn ≥
M(r)
M(ψ)
(log2 q)
2, (6)
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix E. 
IV. SC3 : SECURE CODED COOPERATIVE COMPUTATION
In this section, we present our secure coded cooperative
computation (SC3) mechanism. SC3 consists of packet offload-
ing, attack detection, and attack recovery modules.
A. Dynamic Packet Offloading
The dynamic packet offloading module of SC3 is based on
[1]. In particular, the master offloads coded packets gradually
to workers and receives two ACKs for each transmitted packet;
one confirming the receipt of the packet by the worker, and
the second one (piggybacked to the computed packet) showing
that the packet is computed by the worker. Then, based on
the frequency of the received ACKs, the master decides to
transmit more/less coded packets to that worker. In particular,
each packet pn,i is transmitted to each worker wn before or
right after the computed packet pn,i−1x is received at the
master. For this purpose, the average per packet computing
time E[βn,i] is calculated for each worker wn dynamically
based on the previously received ACKs. Each packet pn,i is
transmitted after waiting E[βn,i] from the time pn,i−1 is sent
or right after packet pn,i−1x is received at the master, thus
reducing the idle time at the workers. This policy is shown to
approach the optimal task completion delay and maximizes the
workers’ efficiency and is shown to improve task completion
delay significantly compared with the literature [1].
B. Attack Detection
Assume that while the dynamic packet offloading process
continues, the set of received packets from worker wn at the
master device during time interval T is Zn (|Zn| = Zn). The
attack detection module of SC3 is applied on Zn periodically
and consists of two phases.
The first phase applies LW function on the packets in Zn
for any worker wn, n ∈ N . Let us assume that attack is
detected in the packets coming from worker wn∗ . Then, all
the packets in Zn∗ are discarded and the malicious worker
wn∗ is removed from the set of workers, i.e., N = N − n∗.
As we discussed earlier, the attack detection probability of LW
function increases with increasing corrupted packets. Thus, if
an attack is detected in this phase, we can consider that most
of the packets are corrupted, so we can discard all the received
packets.
The goal of the second phase is to detect any attacks, which
are not detected in the first phase. Both HW and multiple-
round LW functions are used in this phase. In particular, if
the inequality in Theorem 7 is satisfied, LW function is used
for log2(q) times. Otherwise, HW function is used. If an attack
is not detected, all the packets in Zn are labeled as verified
packets. Otherwise, i.e., if an attack is detected, the attack
recovery module, which is described later in this section, starts.
C. Attack Recovery
If an attack is detected in the second phase of the attack
detection module of SC3, we consider that a small number of
packets are corrupted. Otherwise, the first phase of the attack
detection module could have detected the attack and discarded
all the packets. Thus, the goal of the attack recovery module is
to detect a small number of corrupted packets and recover the
non-corrupted packets, i.e., avoid discarding all the packets.
Let us assume that an attack is detected among the packets
received from wn∗ , i.e., in Zn∗ . In order to pinpoint the
packets that are corrupted, we use a binary search algorithm.
In particular, Zn∗ is divided into two disjoint sets; Z
1
n∗ and
Z2n∗ . The second phase of the attack detection module is run
over these two sets. If an attack is not detected on any of
these sets, all the packets in that set are verified. Otherwise,
the binary search (this set splitting) continues over the sets
where an attack is detected. When the size of a splitted set is
one, i.e., it has one packet in it, and an attack is detected, the
packet in that set is declared a corrupted packet and discarded.
As seen, the attack recovery module can still verify some of
the packets coming from a malicious worker. This is important
to efficiently utilize available resources while still providing
security guarantees.
D. SC3 in a nutshell
SC3 algorithm is provided in Algorithm 1. As detailed in
this algorithm, in SC3, the attack detection module, which if
required will be followed by the attack recovery module, is
applied until the number of verified packets from all workers
reaches R + ǫ (Note that R + ǫ is the number of packets
required for a successful decoding of Fountain codes). In
particular, first, the attack detection module is applied on each
Zn set of packets received from worker wn, n ∈ N during
the time period T , where T is defined as the time period that
R+ ǫ packets are received collectively from all workers, i.e.,∑N
n=1 Zn = R+ ǫ. If all R+ ǫ packets in the set ∪
N
n=1Zn are
labeled as verified, then all workers have been honest and sent
back correct results to the master device. Otherwise, i.e., if an
attack is detected, then the number of correct packets delivered
by honest workers and labeled as verified, is less than R+ ǫ.
In this case, the master device waits until it receives additional
R+ǫ−V packets collectively from all workers, where V is the
number of packets labeled as verified. Then, for each worker
wn, n ∈ N , the attack detection module is applied on the set
of newly received packets. This process is repeated until R+ǫ
packets are labeled as verified. Finally, Fountain decoding is
applied on R+ ǫ packets labeled as verified and the result of
the multiplication task is obtained by the master device.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF SC3
In this section, we first characterize the task completion
delay of SC3 and then we provide a lower bound on the
gap between the task completion delay of SC3 and the task
completion delay of a baseline. The task completion delay is
the time spent to receive R+ ǫ computed and verified packets
at the master device collectively from all workers.
Theorem 8: The average task completion delay of SC3 for
a set of workers {wn, n ∈ N}, out of which {wn, n ∈ Nm}
is the set of malicious workers, is upper bounded by:
E[TSC3 ] ≤ (7)
R+ ǫ∑
n∈N 1/E[βn,i]
+
∑
n∈Nm
zn
(
P + ρc
(
1− P
))
∑
n/∈Nm
1/E[βn,i]
, (8)
Algorithm 1 SC3
1: V = 0
2: while V < R+ ǫ do
3: Determine the time period T as the time interval during
which R + ǫ− V computed packets are received from
all workers collectively.
4: for n = 1 : N do
5: Create the set Zn consisting of packets received from
worker wn during the time period T .
6: Vadd = 0.
7: Apply the attack detection module on Zn and set
Vadd as the number of packets labeled as verified.
8: Update V as V + Vadd.
9: if V ≥ R+ ǫ then
10: Stop the process and use R+ ǫ packets labeled as
verified for Fountain decoding.
where zn is equal to
zn =
R+ ǫ
E[βn,i]
∑
n∈N 1/E[βn,i]
,
ρc is the probability that a packet is corrupted by a malicious
worker, and P is given by
P = 1−
( (znρc)!
2(znρc)
(
(znρc/2)!
)2
)
.
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix F. 
In the following we characterize the task completion delay
of SC3 as compared with a baseline, where the master detects
the malicious workers and takes advantage of only honest
workers to accomplish its task. One method to detect the
malicious workers is using HW function with a high value
for the parameter q, so that the probability of attack detection
given in (5) is close to 1. We call this baseline as HW-only
and denote its task completion delay by THW-only. Note that in
HW-only, if a worker is detected as malicious, all the packets
coming from that worker are discarded, while SC3 uses both
LW and HW functions gracefully to discard only corrupted
packets coming from malicious workers.
Lemma 9: The gap between the task completion delay of
HW-only and the task completion delay of SC3 is lower
bounded by:
THW-only − E[TSC3 ] ≥ (9)
(R + ǫ)(1− ρc)
∑
n∈Nm
1−P
E[βn,i](∑
n∈N 1/E[βn,i]
)(∑
n/∈Nm
1/E[βn,i]
) . (10)
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix G. 
From Lemma 9, we can conclude that the faster the honest
helpers are, the closer are the performances of HW-only and
our SC3. This is expected as the performance of SC3 is
dominated by the fastest workers and the performance of HW-
only is dominated by the speed of honest workers and thus
SC3 performs close to HW-only when the fastest workers
are honest. In addition, smaller ρc (which results in smaller
P ) results in larger gap between HW-only and SC3. This is
expected as smaller ρc results in less number of corrupted
packets delivered by malicious workers and thus using SC3
that takes advantage of non-corrupted packets delivered by
malicious workers results in more performance improvement
compared with HW-only that throws away non-corrupted
packets delivered by malicious workers. Finally, lower bound
on the gap THW-only−E[TSC3 ] is linearly proportional to R+ǫ.
This implies that more improvement is obtained by using SC3
compared with HW-only for larger input matrix A.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our al-
gorithm; Secure Coded Cooperative Computation (SC3) via
simulations. We consider master/worker setup, where some
of the workers are malicious. Each computed packet yn,i is
corrupted by the malicious worker wn with probability ρc.
The computing resources are heterogeneous and vary across
workers, where per packet computing delay βn,i is an i.i.d.
random variable following a shifted exponential distribution.
We compare SC3 with the baselines (i) HW-only, which uses
HW function to detect corrupted packets, while SC3 uses both
LW and HW functions gracefully. In HW-only, if a worker is
detected as malicious, all the packets coming from that worker
are discarded, (ii) Lower Bound, which is obtained by using
C3P proposed in [1], the best known dynamic but unsecured
coded cooperative computation. Note that C3P is not practical
in the presence of an attacker, however it can provide a lower
bound on SC3 and the gap between Lower Bound and SC3
shows the cost that we should pay to make our system secure
against Byzantine attack, and (iii) Upper Bound provided in
(7).
Task Completion Delay vs. Number of Malicious Workers.
Fig. 1 compares the task completion delay of SC3 with the
baselines for increasing number of malicious workers.
In this setup, the total number of workers is N = 150,
the number of rows in matrix A is R = 1K , the number of
columns is C = 1K , the overhead of Fountain codes is 5%,
the probability of packet corruption is ρc = 0.3, and per-packet
computing delay is a shifted exponential random variable with
the mean selected uniformly between 1 and 6 for each worker.
The task completion delay of SC3 and HW-only increases
with increasing number of malicious workers. When the
number of malicious workers increases, there will be more
corrupted packets in the system. These corrupted packets
are detected and discarded by SC3 and HW-only. As more
packets are discarded when the number of malicious workers
is higher, the task completion delay increases. The increase
in the task completion delay of SC3 is less than HW-only
thanks to (i) using both LW and HW functions to reduce
completion time and thus computational complexity, and (ii)
attack recovery module of SC3. SC3 performs better than its
Upper Bound as the Upper Bound is based on the theoretical
analysis in the worst case scenario. Finally, the completion
time of Lower Bound does not change by increasing the
number of malicious workers as it uses C3P in [1], which is
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Bound, and (iii) Upper Bound, with increasing number of malicious workers.
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Fig. 2. Task completion delay of SC3 as compared to (i) HW-only, (ii)
Lower Bound, and (iii) Upper Bound, with increasing probability of packet
corruption.
not designed for an environment with malicious workers and
uses all received packets including the corrupted packets to
obtain the computation task result. By increasing the number
of malicious workers, the gap between the performance of
SC3 and the Lower Bound increases, as the cost for providing
a secure system increases when the adversary attacks more
workers.
Task Completion Delay versus Packet Corruption Probabil-
ity. Fig. 2 compares the task completion delay of SC3 with
(i) HW-only, (ii) Lower Bound, and (iii) Upper Bound for
different values of ρc, the probability that a delivered packet
by a malicious worker is corrupted. The number of workers,
the number of rows in A, Fountain coding overhead, and per-
packet computing delay are the same as the previous setup
above. The number of malicious workers is Nm = 50.
The task completion delay of HW-only does not change with
increasing packet corruption probability. The reason is that
HW-only does not have attack recovery feature and discards
all the packets coming from a malicious worker. On the other
hand, task completion delay of SC3 is significantly lower than
HW-only especially when the packet corruption probability
is low thanks to using both LW and HW functions and
employing the attack recovery module. Again, the completion
time of Lower Bound does not change by increasing ρc and
by increasing ρc, the gap between the performance of SC
3 and
the Lower Bound increases, as the cost for providing a secure
system increases when number of corrupted packets increases.
Task Completion Delay Gap between SC3 and HW-only. Fig.
3 shows the gap between the HW-only and SC3 and compares
the simulated gap with the lower bound of the gap provided
in (9) for the total number of N = 80 workers out of which
Nm = 40 are malicious. The number of rows in A is R =
1K for Figs. 3(a) and (b), the number of columns is C =
1K , Fountain coding overhead is 5%, the probability of packet
corruption is ρc = 0.3 for Figs. 3(a) and (c), and per-packet
computing delay is a shifted exponential random variable with
the mean selected uniformly between 3 and 4 for each worker
for Figs. 3(b) and (c).
Fig. 3(a) shows the gap versus the speed of computation
at honest helpers. The per-packet computing delay is a shifted
exponential random variable with the mean selected uniformly
between 3 and 4 for each malicious worker. For each honest
worker, the mean is selected uniformly between 1 and 2 for
the first simulated points, between 3 and 4 for the second
simulated points, and between 5 and 6 for the third simulated
points. As seen, the faster the honest workers are, the closer
are the performances of the HW-only and our SC3. This
observation confirms our analysis in section V.
Fig. 3(b) shows the gap versus ρc, the probability of packet
corruption by a malicious worker. As seen, larger ρc (which
results in more corrupted packets delivered by malicious
workers) results in smaller gap between HW-only and SC3.
This observation confirms our analysis in section V.
Fig. 3(c) shows the gap versus the number of rows of matrix
A. As seen, the gap between HW-only and SC3P increases
with an increase in the number of rows of matrix A. This
observation confirms our analysis in section V stating that
more improvement will be obtained by using SC3 compared
with HW-only for larger input matrix A.
VII. RELATED WORK
Coded computation, advocating mixing data in compu-
tationally intensive tasks by employing erasure codes and
offloading these tasks to other devices for computation, has
recently received a lot of attention, [1]–[13]. For example,
coded cooperative computation is shown to provide higher
reliability, smaller delay, and reduced communication cost in
MapReduce framework [19], where computationally intensive
tasks are offloaded to distributed server clusters [20]. The
effectiveness of coded computation in terms of task completion
delay has been investigated in [1], [7], [11]. In [21], the
same problem is considered, but with the assumption that
workers are heterogeneous in terms of their resources. In [1], a
dynamic and adaptive algorithm with reduced task completion
time is introduced for heterogeneous workers. As compared to
this line of work, we consider secure coded computation by
focusing on Byzantine attacks.
There is existing work at the intersection of coded computa-
tion and security by specifically focusing on privacy [2], [22]–
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[24]. As compared to this line of work, we focus on Byzantine
attacks and use homomorphic hash functions. Homomorphic
hash functions have been widely used for transmission of
network coded data. Corrupted network coded packets are
detected by applying homomorphic hash functions that we
consider in this work [14]. The hash function is applied to
random linear combinations of network coded packets in [15].
SC3, although similar to these work, is more efficient in terms
of computational efficiency, which was not the main concern
of [14], [15] as their focus was on transmitting network coded
packets, not computation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we focused on secure edge computing against
Byzantine attacks. We considered a master/worker scenario
where honest and malicious workers with heterogeneous re-
sources are connected to a master device. We designed a
secure coded cooperative computation mechanism (SC3) that
provides both security and computation efficiency guarantees
by gracefully combining homomorphic hash functions, and
coded cooperative computation. Homomorphic hash functions
are used against Byzantine attacks and coded cooperative
computation is used to improve computation efficiency when
edge resources are heterogeneous and time-varying. Simula-
tions results show that SC3 improves task completion delay
significantly.
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APPENDIX A: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
αn = h(
Zn∑
i=1
ciy˜n,i) (11)
= mod
(
g mod (
∑Zn
i=1 ciy˜n,i,q), r
)
(12)
= mod
(
g mod (
∑Zn
i=1 ciyn,i,q), r
)
(13)
= mod
(
g mod (
∑Zn
i=1 ci
∑C
j=1 pn,i,jxj ,q), r
)
(14)
= mod
(
g(
∑Zn
i=1
∑C
j=1 cipn,i,jxj)−qq
′
, r
)
(15)
= mod
(
g
∑Zn
i=1
∑C
j=1 cipn,i,jxj , r
)
× mod (g−qq
′
, r), (16)
where q′ is the quotient of dividing (
∑Zn
i=1
∑C
j=1 cipn,i,jxj)
by q. On the other hand, as mentioned before, g can be written
as b(r−1)/q and thus by using the condition of q|(r − 1) and
using Fermat’s little theorem, we have:
mod (gq×q
′
, r) = mod (bq×q
′×(r−1)/q, r) (17)
= mod (b(r−1)×q
′
, r) (18)
= 1. (19)
From (19) and (16), we have:
mod
(
g mod (
∑Zn
i=1
∑C
j=1 cipn,i,jxj,q), r
)
(20)
= mod
(
g
∑Zn
i=1
∑C
j=1 cipn,i,jxj , r
)
(21)
From the above equation, we can conclude that:
mod (gxj , r) = mod (g mod (xj,q), r) (22)
and
mod (gxj
∑Zn
i=1 cipn,i,j , r) =
mod (gxj mod (
∑Zn
i=1 cipn,i,j ,q), r) (23)
On the other hand, from (19) and (16), we have:
αn = mod
(
g
∑Zn
i=1
∑C
j=1 cipn,i,jxj , r
)
(24)
= mod (
C∏
j=1
g
∑Zn
i=1 cipn,i,jxj , r) (25)
= mod (
C∏
j=1
gxj mod (
∑Zn
i=1 cipn,i,j ,q), r) (26)
= mod (
C∏
j=1
( mod (g mod (xj ,q), r)) mod (
∑Zn
i=1 cipn,i,j ,q), r)
(27)
= mod
( C∏
j=1
h(xj)
mod (
∑Zn
i=1 cipn,i,j ,q), r
)
(28)
= βn (29)
where, (26) comes from (23) and (27) comes from (22). This
concludes the proof.
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This kind of attack is not detected by the master device if
the coefficients ci for corrupted packets are selected such that
the added δ’s are canceled out with the subtracted δ’s. For
example, let us assume there are Z˜n = 4 corrupted packets
of yn,1 + δ, yn,2 + δ, yn,3 − δ, and yn,4 − δ among Zn = 10
packets received from worker wn. For this attack not to be
detected, there are six possibilities for values of coefficients
{c1, c2, c3, c4}: {1, 1, 1, 1}, {1,−1, 1,−1}, {1,−1,−1, 1},
{−1, 1, 1,−1}, {−1, 1,−1, 1}, and {−1,−1,−1,−1}. Note
that the other six coefficients {c5, . . . , c10} can have any value
as those packets are not corrupted. All possible cases for
the first four coefficients are 24 = 16 cases. Therefore, the
probability of attack detection for this example is 1 − 6/16.
In general, for Z˜n corrupted packets, the number of cases
the attack cannot be detected is equal to the combination of( Z˜n
Z˜n/2
)
. The reason is that half of the Z˜n coefficients for which
the corrupted packets are added by δ can have any value but
the other half for which the corrupted packets are subtracted
by δ should be chosen such that when they are multiplied by
their correspondent coefficients, the added δ’s can be canceled
out with the subtracted δ’s. Note that any permutation of
coefficients for which the corrupted packets are added by δ (or
subtracted by δ) do not have any effect on the attack detection.
As the total number of cases for coefficient selections of the
corrupted packets is equal to 2Z˜n , the probability that the
attack is not detected is equal to
( Z˜nZ˜n/2)
2Z˜n
= ( Z˜n!
2Z˜n×(( Z˜n2 )!)
2
).
This concludes the proof.
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If the malicious worker corrupts only one packet out of
Zn packets, it is obvious that this attack can be detected
by applying FLW . Among the remaining attack patterns,
i.e., all attack patterns, where the malicious worker corrupts
more than one packet, the most difficult one to detect is a
symmetric pairwise Byzantine attack, where the malicious
worker corrupts two packets out of Zn packets. The reason
is that the attack is detected by applying function FLW unless
the coefficients corresponding to the corrupted packets have
a systematic structure, while the coefficients corresponding
to the remaining packets can have any value. Therefore, for
FLW to fail the attack detection, among all attacks with more
than two corrupted packets, the function has the least freedom
on selecting the coefficients when the number of corrupted
packets is two. This results in the least probability of attack
detection when the number of corrupted packets is two. This
fact can also be confirmed in Lemma 2, as the detection
probability presented in (4) is an increasing function of the
number of corrupted packets. On the other hand, among all
attack patterns that changes two of the packets, the symmetri-
cal attacks, where one of the packets is corrupted by adding δ
to the result and the other packet is corrupted by subtracting
the same amount of δ from the result is the most difficult
one to be detected (In fact, the probability of attack detection
for the asymmetrical pairwise attack is 100%). Therefore, the
most difficult attack pattern for function FLW is symmetrical
pairwise Byzantine attack, for which the probability of attack
detection is 50%. This concludes the proof.
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In order for an attack not to be detected by applying HW
function, the value of the corrupted packets should be changed
by the attacker such that αn in (2) is equal to βn in (3). For
this condition to be satisfied, mod (
∑Zn
i=1 ciy˜n,i, q) should
be equal to mod (
∑Zn
i=1 ciyn,i, q). In other words, if the
following condition is satisfied, then the attack will not be
detected:
mod (
∑
i∈Z˜n
ci(yn,i − y˜n,i), q) = 0, (30)
where Z˜n with size |Z˜n| = Z˜n is the set of corrupted packets
among all Zn received packets, i.e., (yn,i − y˜n,i) 6= 0, i ∈
Z˜n. For this condition to be satisfied, one of the coefficients
{cj |j ∈ Z˜n} out of all Z˜n coefficients, should be selected
depending on the values of the other coefficients, i.e., cj should
be selected such that the following condition is satisfied:
mod (cj(yn,j − y˜n,j), q) =
mod (
∑
i∈Z˜n,i6=j
ci(yn,i − y˜n,i), q) (31)
Since q is a prime number, from the modular arithmetic
principles, cj has a unique solution. Considering that cj is
selected randomly in Fq by the master device, the probability
that the selected coefficient cj satisfies the above equation is
1/q. Therefore, the probability that the attack is not detected
by HW function is 1/q. This concludes the proof.
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According to Lemma 3, the probability of attack detection
when LW function is used for one round is at least 12 .
When LW function is used for two rounds, i.e., no attack
is detected by selecting the coefficients ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ Zn
uniformly randomly from {−1, 1} and thus a different set
of coefficients ci ∈ {−1, 1}, 1 ≤ i ≤ Zn are selected
uniformly at random, the probability of attack detection is at
least 1 − 12 ×
2Zn−1−1
2Zn−1 . Similarly, the probability of attack
detection when LW function is used for K rounds is at least
1−
∏K
k=0
2Zn−1−k
2Zn−k , which can be approximated as
1
2K when
Zn ≫ log2K . Therefore, for K = log2 q, the probability of
attack detection when LW function is used for log2 q rounds
is 1 − 1/q, which is equal to the attack detection probability
of HW function.
According to Theorem 4, the computational complexity for
one round of LW function is O(CM(r) log2 q) and thus the
computational complexity of log2 q rounds of LW function
is O(CM(r)(log2 q)
2). On the other hand, according to
Theorem 6, the computational complexity of HW function
is O(CZnM(φ)). Therefore, if Zn ≥
M(r)
M(ψ) (log2(q))
2, the
computational complexity of log2(q)-round LW function is
lower than HW function.
This concludes the proof.
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In order to characterize the completion time of SC3, we
calculate the required time for receiving the required number
of packets collectively from all workers at the master device
during each time period T , defined in Algorithm 1.
According to Algorithm 1, the first time period T is de-
fined as the time interval during which R + ǫ packets are
received collectively from all workers. Using the dynamic
packet offloading module of SC3, this time period is equal to
R+K∑
n∈N 1/E[βn,i]
, according to (17) in [1], where E[βn,i] is the
average of per packet computing time at worker wn, n ∈ N .
According to Algorithm 1, the second time period T is
defined as the time interval during which R + ǫ − V packets
are received collectively from all workers, where V is the
number of packets labeled as verified after applying the attack
detection module on the packets received during the first time
interval. In the worst case scenario, R + ǫ − V additional
packets that should be received at the master device and
labeled as verified, are delivered only by honest workers.
This worst case scenario results in the maximum time for
receiving R + ǫ − V additional packets, which is equal to
R+ǫ−V∑
n/∈Nm
1/E[βn,i]
[1]. By taking into account this worst case
scenario and the upper bound on the average value of R+ǫ−V
(provided in Lemma 10), and adding the time during the
first time period, the completion time is upper bounded by
R+K∑
n∈N 1/E[βn,i]
+
∑
n∈Nm
zn(P+ρc(1−P ))
∑
n/∈Nm
1/E[βn,i]
.
Lemma 10: The average number of packets among all R+ǫ
packets received during the first time period T , that are not
labeled as verified by SC3, is upper bounded by:
R+ ǫ − V ≤
∑
n∈Nm
zn(P + ρc(1 − P )), (32)
where P is given by P = 1−
(
(znρc)!
2(znρc)
(
(znρc/2)!
)2
)
.
Proof: The packets received during the first time period T ,
that are not labeled as verified by SC3, consist of two kinds:
(i) Packets received from malicious workers, where attack is
detected by applying the LW function: The average number of
these packets is equal to
∑
n∈Nsetm
znP , where P is equal
to the probability of attack detection by LW function when
applied on zn packets received from worker wn, n ∈ N . From
(4), P is given by P = 1−
(
(znρc)!
2(znρc)
(
(znρc/2)!
)2
)
.
(ii) Corrupted packets received from malicious workers,
where attack is not detected by applying the LW function but
attack is detected in the attack recovery module. The average
number of such packets is upper bounded by
∑
n∈Nm
znρc(1−
P ), where znρc is the average number of corrupted packets
received from the malicious worker wn and 1 − P is the
probability that the attack is not detected by applying function
LW. Note that for larger values of q, the probability of attack
detection by applying HW function or multiple-round LW
function is closer to 1 and the exact value gets closer to its
upper bound.
This concludes the proof. 
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HW-only uses only the honest workers for computing R+ǫ
packets, i.e., all workers that are not in the set Nm, and thus its
task completion delay is equal to THW-only =
R+ǫ∑
n/∈Nm
1/E[βn,i]
[1], which can be equivalently written as:
THW-only =
R+ ǫ∑
n/∈Nm
1/E[βn,i]
(33)
=
(R + ǫ)
∑
n∈N 1/E[βn,i]∑
n/∈Nm
1/E[βn,i]
∑
n∈N 1/E[βn,i]
(34)
=
∑
n/∈Nm
R+ǫ
E[βn,i]∑
n/∈Nm
1/E[βn,i]
∑
n∈N 1/E[βn,i]
+ (35)
∑
n∈N 1/E[βn,i]
∑
n∈Nm
R+ǫ
E[βn,i]
∑
n∈N 1/E[βn,i]∑
n/∈Nm
1/E[βn,i]
∑
n∈N 1/E[βn,i]
(36)
=
R + ǫ∑
n∈N 1/E[βn,i]
+
∑
n∈Nm
R+ǫ
E[βn,i]
∑
n∈N 1/E[βn,i]∑
n/∈Nm
1/E[βn,i]
(37)
=
R + ǫ∑
n∈N 1/E[βn,i]
+
∑
n∈Nm
zn∑
n/∈Nm
1/E[βn,i]
(38)
Using the upper bound on E[TSC3 ] provided in Theorem 8,
THW-only − E[TSC3 ] can be written as:
THW-only − E[TSC3 ] ≥ (39)
∑
n∈Nm
zn∑
n/∈Nm
1/E[βn,i]
−
∑
n∈Nm
zn
(
P + ρc
(
1− P
))
∑
n/∈Nm
1/E[βn,i]
(40)
=
∑
n∈Nm
zn(1− ρc)
(
1− P
)
∑
n/∈Nm
1/E[βn,i]
(41)
=
(R+ ǫ)(1− ρc)
∑
n∈Nm
1−P
E[βn,i](∑
n∈N 1/E[βn,i]
)(∑
n/∈Nm
1/E[βn,i]
) . (42)
This concludes the proof.
